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International Law Studies - Volume 77
Lillich on the Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad
Thomas C. Wingfield & James E Meyen (Editors)

Chapter II
The Traditional Writers on International Law

T

he classical writers were followed by the “traditional writers” on international law of the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries, they include Phillimore, Bluntschli, Bonfils, Pradier-Fodere, Westlake, Oppenheim,
Moore, Stockton, Clark, Hodges, Borchard, Fauchelle, Hyde, Winfield, Offutt,
Dunn, Hindmarsh and Accioly.
These writers witnessed the developing State practices which provided an
interesting counterpoint to the theoretical foundations developed by the earlier classical scholars.
A. Phillimore. Phillimore, an English publicist writing in 1854, buttressed the
theoretical premises of the “classical” textwriters with the actual practice of
States as it had developed by the mid-Nineteenth Century. The general conclusion he reached was that “[t]he state, to which the foreigner belongs, may interfere for his protection when he has received positive maltreatment, or when
he has been denied ordinary justice in the foreign country.”1 However,
Phillimore specified certain preconditions that must be met before such self-help
could be undertaken. “[I]t behooves the interfering State to take the utmost
care,” he cautioned, first, that the commission of the wrong be clearly established; second, that the “denial of the local tribunals to decide the question at issue be no less clearly established.”2 In addition to citing Grotius, Phillimore
supported his assertion with a reference to the reply of Great Britain to the King
of Prussia in 1753, wherein it was maintained that a State may exercise protection only “in cases of violent injuries directed or supported by the State; and justice absolutely denied . . . by all the tribunals, and afterwards by the Prince.”3

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad
Phillimore also distinguished between domiciliary and transient nationals in
foreign countries. The essence of the distinction was that, while a national of
one State who becomes domiciled in another State accepts conditions in that
State for what they are, the transient national does not. According to
Phillimore, the domiciliary
“must be held to have considered the habits of the people, the laws of the
country, and their mode of administration, before he established therein his
household gods [sic] and made it the principal seat of his fortunes. He cannot
therefore expect, that every complaint, which he may be disposed to urge upon
his native Government, with respect to these matters, will of necessity be
considered as requiring national interposition.”4

Phillimore devoted an entire chapter to the then topical aspect of the protection and collection of debts owed by one State to another State’s nationals.
Citing Vattel, Phillimore stated that “[t]he right of interference on the part of a
State, for the purpose of enforcing the performance of justice to its citizens from
a foreign State, stands upon an unquestionable foundation, when the foreign
state has become itself the debtor of these citizens.”5
Building upon this theoretical foundation, Phillimore invoked relevant
State practice, exemplified by the famous Palmerston Circular of 1848.6 This
statement of policy by the British government recognized that it had the right
to bring claims on behalf of British subjects who held public bonds and money
securities of defaulting foreign States, but that the decision whether or not to
assert such a claim was entirely within its discretion. “It is therefore simply a
question of discretion with the British Government,” wrote Palmerston,
“whether [a] matter should or should not be taken up by diplomatic negotiation, and the decision of that question of discretion turns entirely upon British
and domestic considerations.”7 The circular suggested that only in exceptional
cases would the government’s discretion be exercised in the subject’s favor.
Phillimore, drawing upon the theoretical foundations of Grotius and Vattel,
substantiated his assertions with examples from ongoing State practice. From
his discussion, it would seem that Phillimore was contemplating primarily the
diplomatic protection of nationals abroad. In any event, he considered that a
principle of international law had developed, both in theory and in practice,
which justified a State’s protection of the lives, property and debts owed its nationals living abroad, perhaps even by the use of forcible measures.
B. Bluntschli. To Bluntschli, writing in 1874, the right of a State to protect its
nationals abroad appeared unquestionable. Bluntschli wrote:
8
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The Traditional Writers on International Law
The state has the right and the duty to protect its nationals abroad by all the
means authorized by international law:
a) When the foreign state has proceeded against them in violation of the
principles of this law.
b) When ill treatment or injuries received by one of its nationals was not caused
directly by the foreign state, but it did nothing to oppose such ill treatment or
injuries.
Each state has the right to request reparation for the injustice, reimbursement for
the injuries caused, and to demand, according to the circumstances, guarantees
against the commission of similar acts.8

Bluntschli illustrated this principle with several examples, including a
State’s enslaving of another State’s nationals, depriving them of their religion,
destroying their goods, treating them with cruelty, violating treaties of commerce, and not respecting the law of nations governing the relations between
States.9 As an example of State practice in this regard, Bluntschli cited the
British military expedition against the King of Abyssinia in 1867 who refused to
free British nationals whom the king illegally held.10 According to Bluntschli,
this example involved an exercise of the right of forcible protection par
excellence.
Bluntschli expanded his examination to the situation where the foreign
State citizen, and not the State itself, commits the injurious act. In such a case,
he argued, the allegedly injured person or persons first must seek a remedy in
the courts of the State in which the injury occurred. However, if that State refuses or otherwise fails to render justice, the State of which the injured party is a
national may intervene.11
At the same time, Bluntschli limited the principle of protection—at least
non-forcible protection—to times where there was no internal strife or civil
war in the foreign State.12 His rationale for this position appears to be that a
State should not be held responsible for acts over which it has no control, as is
likely to be the case in such circumstances. As is apparent, this reasoning illustrates Bluntschli’s assumption of the inseparability of the corollary principles of
the right of diplomatic protection and State responsibility.
In support of this limitation upon the right of protection, Bluntschli cited
several examples, including the Don Pacifico case in 1849; the notes of Prince
Schwarzenberg on 24 April 1850 and Prince Nesselrode on 2 May 1850, to the
effect that a State forced by revolution to take one of its cities controlled by
9
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Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad
insurgents should not be obliged to indemnify foreigners who by chance are injured in the process; the refusal of the United States to indemnify Spanish nationals injured in New Orleans in 1851; the U.S. Civil War; and the decision of
the Great Powers in resolving the Greek-Turkish conflict on 15 January 1869.13
In contrast to Phillimore, Bluntschi made no reference to the “classical”
writings of Grotius and Vattel. Instead, he merely stated that a right and duty of
protection existed and cited several supporting examples. As can be seen from
the above discussion, however, Bluntschli—like Phillimore—apparently
viewed the right of protection as involving principally diplomatic, rather than
forcible, measures.
C. Bonfils. Writing in 1894, the Frenchman Bonfils similarly recognized the
right of a nation to protect its nationals abroad stating, “To recommend its nationals to the authorities of the country in which they have established their
residence, to defend their interests in diplomatic notes, to demand reparation
for the wrongs which they have suffered . . . is not to intervene; on the contrary,
it is to recognize the sovereignty of the State addressed.”14
Although the above formulation may appear to support only the principle of
diplomatic protection, it is clear from Bonfils’ description of State practice that
his principal concern lay with forcible protection. As examples, Bonfils cited
the French blockade of Argentine ports in 1838-1840,15 as well as the initial
stages of the combined action of England, Spain, and France against Mexico in
1861.16 According to Bonfils, this latter example began as a joint effort to obtain reparation for damages to nationals of the three States and to ensure Mexico’s compliance with its international agreements. When the effort turned
into an attempt by Napoleon to install an empire under Maximilian of Austria,
the character of the action changed from the protection of nationals to that of
flagrant intervention.17
Turning to the question of the right to protect nationals who are creditors of
foreign governments, Bonfils again relied on State practice, citing the
Palmerston Circular.18 He observed that “[i]n fact, the European Governments
have intervened in favor of their nationals who had lent money to foreign governments, against weak states, incapable of resisting, but not against strong
States. . . .”19 As an example of such intervention, Bonfils cited the control exerted by France and Britain over Egypt in 1876 to protect the investments of
their nationals.20 Clearly, for Bonfils the right of forcible protection extended
to both creditor and property rights of a State’s nationals as well as the protection of their lives.
10
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The Traditional Writers on International Law
D. Pradier-Fodere. The Frenchman Pradier-Fodere, writing in 1885, described
the right of forcible protection of nationals and their property abroad as rooted
in the writings of the “classical” publicists, particularly Vattel. According to
Pradier-Fodere, “[i]t is the duty of all states to protect their nationals in foreign
countries by all means which international law authorizes.”21 Citing Vattel, he
stated further that States possess “the right to obtain justice by force, if it cannot be done otherwise.”22
Pradier-Fodere, however, recognized certain restrictions upon the exercise
of the right of protection. Thus, a foreigner who had become domiciled in a
State had less justification to call upon his government for protection than a
transient foreigner.23 In addition, he observed that in most cases protection was
accomplished more effectively by diplomatic demands for compensation than
by forcible self-help.24 Nevertheless, he pointed to certain examples where resort to force or the threat thereof was justified as a protective measure. In this
regard he cited the Anglo-French control of Egypt in 1876 to protect the interests of British and French creditors,25 as well as the threatened Anglo-French
intervention in the Ottoman Empire in 1859 to remodel its financial laws.26
E. Westlake. Westlake, an Englishman writing in 1904, offered an extensive discussion of the right to protect nationals abroad under the heading of “denial of
justice.” “If [foreign States] are wanting either to the judicial or to the administrative department,” he argued, “the state to which a foreigner belongs has a
claim to step in for his protection which often has this in common with political
claims, that the justice which the foreign power demands for its subject is not
measurable by definite rules.”27 In support of this somewhat amorphous proposition, Westlake cited Vattel,28 the “general conscience of the peoples of European civilization,”29 and several statements by officials of the U.S.
government.30 Westlake, like Bluntschli, recognized an important limitation
on the right to protect nationals abroad. “During an insurrection,” he stated,
“the best will on the part of the state government, backed by the best laws, is
often unable to prevent or to punish regrettable occurrences. In those
circumstances it is not usual for a state to indemnify its own subjects, and
foreigners can have no better claim than nationals in a matter not generally
recognized as one for indemnity. . . .”31

Westlake also considered the right of protection in the case of contractual
claims. Examining, first, U.S. practice in this regard, he noted the adoption of a
cautious policy. Citing statements by Secretary of State Seward in 1866 and
11
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Secretary of State Fish in 1870, Westlake concluded that U.S. nationals investing in foreign States had “assumed the risk” of such ventures, and that the U.S.
government normally would not intervene on their behalf.32 Here can be seen
the developmemt of the concept that in financial matters, (contracts,
debtor-creditor relationships) that States would not intervene with force on behalf of a national who had contracted with a foreign State or one of its citizens.
F. Oppenheim. Oppenheim, another Englishman writing in 1905, recognized
the validity of the right of forcible protection. According to Oppenheim, “[b]y
a universally recognized customary rule of the “Law of Nations” every State
holds a right of protection over its citizens abroad. . . .33 In his view, this right
was discretionary, not obligatory.34 Oppenheim recognized several means by
which the right might be enforced, including diplomatic notes, retortion and
reprisals, and intervention or war where necessary.35
Oppenheim offered little guidance about which protective technique was
appropriate in a particular case. Instead, he merely stated that “[e]verything
depends upon the merits of the individual case and must be left to the discretion of the State concerned.”36 However, he did mention certain criteria that a
State might consider in exercising its discretion, including “whether the
wronged foreigner was only traveling through or had settled down in the country, whether his behavior has been provocative or not, how far the foreign Government identified itself with the acts of officials or subjects, and the like.”37
G. Moore. Writing in 1905 on the subject of U.S. diplomacy, John Bassett
Moore also addressed the question of whether forcible self-help could be used
to protect nationals and their property abroad.38 Underlying his discussion was
the proposition that ‘‘[a]mong the rules of conduct prescribed for the United
States by the statesmen who formulated its foreign policy, none was conceived
to be more fundamental or more distinctively American than that which forbade intervention in the political affairs of other nations.”39 However, Moore
maintained that “[t]he right of the government to intervene for the protection
of its citizens in foreign lands and on the high seas never was doubted; nor was
such action withheld in proper cases.”40 Moore supplemented this brief analysis
with a careful description of a large number of instances of intervention for
such protective purposes.41
H. Stockton. A brief discussion of the right of forcible protection of the lives and
property of nationals abroad is afforded by the work of Charles H. Stockton, a
U.S. naval officer and legal scholar writing in 1911. Departing from the
12
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The Traditional Writers on International Law
traditional emphasis upon diplomatic pressures to protect nationals abroad,
Stockton proposed that special measures be utilized in situations involving
“weak states with unstable governments.” In such situations, he argued, “it at
times occurs that citizens abroad must be protected at once, not by diplomatic
representation; there is not time for that, but by the employment of naval
force.”42 Stockton invoked as authority for his position the appropriate Navy
regulations governing the use of naval force.43 Stockton also discussed briefly
measures that might be justified in the case of another class of governments,
the “semi-civilized or barbarous.” In these situations, “intervention by force on
behalf of citizens domiciled or sojourning there is a more common matter. In
these countries the employment of naval forces is the principal means of such
protection, added thereto at times by landing of military detachments.”44
I. Clark. The right of a State to protect its nationals and their property abroad
was spelled out in considerable detail by J. Reuben Clark, writing as Solicitor
for the U.S. Department of State in 1912.45 According to Clark, the existence
of such a right often was obscured by the tendency that many international law
writers exhibited to apply the same strictures to the protection of nationals
abroad that they applied to political interventions.46 When a State’s motive in
employing forcible self-help was simply “the protection of citizens or subjects. . .
until the government concerned is willing or able itself to afford the protection,”47 he believed it not subject to the same criticisms as a purely political intervention. From an analysis of the writings of the many authorities cited in his
study,48 Clark concluded that:
There is considerable authority for the proposition that such interposition by one
State in the internal affairs of another State for the purpose of affording adequate
protection to its citizens resident in the other, as well as for the protection of the
property of such citizens, is not only not improper, but, on the contrary, is based
upon, is in accord with, and is the exercise of a right recognized by international
law.49

The remainder of Clark’s study comprises an extensive listing of instances in
which the United States had acted in accordance with this right of forcible
protection.
J. Hodges. Henry Hodges, a U.S. author writing in 1915, discussed the right of
forcible protection under the rubric of “non-political intervention.”50 His justifiable rationales for such intervention consisted of the protection of citizens,
the denial of justice and the protection of missionaries. All three of these
13
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Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad
categories include situations, which could fall within the principle of forcible
protection.
Regarding his rationale for the protection of citizens, Hodges stated that
“[w]hen order is neglected by, or is impossible for the foreign government, then
the more advanced state has a right to intervene for the protection of the life
and property of its citizens.”51 According to Hodges the measures a protecting
State could take might involve, “the establishment and enforcement of some
degree of law and order in that community.”52
With reference to the “denial of justice” justification for intervention,
Hodges adopted the view of Secretary of State Bayard, who had stated “[t]hat
the State to which a foreigner belongs may intervene for his protection when
he has been denied ordinary justice in a foreign country, and also in the case of
a plain violation of the substance of natural justice is a proposition universally
recognized.”53 In contrast to the protection of citizens justification, Hodges’
discussion of denial of justice appears to be geared more to diplomatic than to
forcible measures of protection.54
“Respecting the protection of missionaries,” Hodges noted, “the United
States shows about the same consideration as she does in respect to other
classes of citizens resident abroad.”55 Thus, according to Hodges, “[t]he United
States does not go so far in these matters as do some of the European states
which undertake to assume a limited protectorship over Christian communities, especially in Turkey.”56 In addition, the examples cited by Hodges in this
regard, such as the Caroline case and Pelew Islands dispute in 1893,57 suggest
that such protection under those facts is limited to diplomatic as opposed to
forcible measures.58
K. Borchard. In discussing U.S. practice, Edwin Borchard observed in 1915 that
‘‘[t]he army or navy has frequently been used for the protection of citizens or
their property in foreign countries in cases of emergency where the local government has failed, through inability or unwillingness, to afford adequate protection to the persons or property of the foreigners in question.”59 His analysis
consisted primarily of a description of U.S. practice with a minimum of theoretical discussion. The closest he came to justifying such forcible protection under
international law was to cite the Memorandum of J. Reuben Clark which stated
that “when confined to the purpose of assuring the safety of citizens abroad, or
exacting redress for a delinquent failure to afford local protection, the action
must be considered not as a case of intervention, but as non-belligerent interposition.”60
14
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The Traditional Writers on International Law
Borchard listed at least five purposes for which U.S. military personnel had
been landed for “non-belligerent interposition” reasons: (1) the protection of
U.S. citizens in “disturbed localities”; (2) the punishment of natives for injuries
to U.S. citizens; (3) the suppression of local riots; (4) the collection of indemnities; and (5) the seizure of custom houses as security for the payment of
claims.61 He observed that most of these landings had occurred in Latin America as the result of the “hegemony of the United States on this continent and
the force of the Monroe Doctrine. . . . ”62 Borchard indicated that such landings
had not always been against the will of the local government; indeed, sometimes they actually had been carried out in response to an express invitation.63
As examples of “non-belligerent interposition” involving the use of force,
Borchard cited the joint action of the United States and other nations in China
in 1900 at the time of the Boxer Rebellion,64 as well as the landing of American
troops in Nicaragua in 1910.65 He maintained, however, that such interventions were “by accident or unavoidable consequence. . . , rather than by principal design.66 This statement however, seems to be more political than legal
pronunciation.
Borchard concluded his analysis with an examination of whether congressional action was required to authorize the use of the armed forces for the protection of U.S. citizens abroad.67 His conclusion was that such authorization
was unnecessary given the then-predominant view that “the Executive has unlimited authority to use the armed forces of the United States for protective
purposes abroad in any manner and on any occasion he considers expedient.”68
Thus, in contrast to most of the writers discussed previously, Borchard avoided
any detailed justification of the right of protection under international law. Instead, he analyzed U.S. practice as it had developed and attempted to draw
generalizations therefrom. What emerged was the view that forcible protection
was justified, at least for certain “non-belligerent” objectives.
L. Fauchille. In a discussion of intervention and international law, the Frenchman Fauchille, writing in 1922, noted that the use of force to protect nationals
abroad was a recognized exception to the established principle of international
law condemning intervention. He noted that many writers thought it not intervention “to force a state, either by reprisals or the force of arms, to fulfill its international obligations or to compensate for an injustice or an insult. There is,
then, according to these writers, coercion, violence, but not intervention.”69
As an example of such use of force, Fauchille cited the combined action of
Great Britain, Spain and France against Mexico in 1861 to obtain compensation for injuries to their nationals and to ensure the fulfillment by Mexico of
15
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Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad
contractual obligations vis-à-vis the respective governments.70 In addition,
Fauchille cited the combined action against the Chinese during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 to protect the diplomatic representatives and nationals of the
countries concerned,71 as well as the 1902 blockade of Venezuela by Great Britain, Germany and Italy to obtain payment on behalf of their nationals who were
victims of civil wars in Venezuela.72 Thus the views of Fauchille represent a further recognition of the right of forcible protection at the levels of both theory
and State practice.
M. Hyde. Recognition of the right of forcible protection is evident in the work
of Charles Cheney Hyde, writing in 1922.73 Starting from the premise that forcible intervention by one State in the affairs of another was illegal, Hyde recognized several exceptions, including self-defense and the protection of
nationals.74 With reference to the latter principle, Hyde wrote that “[i]f it can
be shown . . . that . . . acts [of a foreign State] are immediately injurious to the
nationals of a particular foreign State grounds for interference by it might be
acknowledged.”75 It is interesting to note, however, that Hyde seemed to prefer
collective, rather than individual, measures to accomplish such interference.
“It is the mode of collective interference, through an established agency . . .
which characterize[s] the existing tendency and afford[s] hope of the development of a sounder practice than has hitherto prevailed.”76 Hyde’s principle of
“collective interference” proved to be the cornerstone of present day United
Nations and NATO actions throughout the world.
Hyde noted several instances in which U.S. military forces have engaged in
such interference for the protection of nationals, notably the collective measures in the Boxer Rebellion in 1900,77 the unilateral action of U.S. naval forces
in the punishment of natives on Formosa in 1867,78 and the landings of U.S.
forces in Nicaragua and Honduras in 1910 and 1911.79 A common element
present in most of the cases noted by Hyde was that such landings were on “foreign territory which, in most instances, has been that of a country not familiar
with European civilization, and not, at the time, recognized for all purposes as a
member of the family of nations.80 This comment suggests that, in Hyde’s view,
forcible protection was easier to justify in instances involving acts in States not
adhering to the standards of conduct observed by the more “advanced” European States.
N. Winfield. In his discussion in 1924 of both valid and invalid grounds for intervention in international law, Winfield, an Englishman, rejected as unsound
the use of nationality as a justification for intervention. He observed that such
16
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arguments tend to present themselves in two forms: “(i) Where the interveners
are of a nationality identical with that of the party for whose benefit they intervene . . . [and] (ii) Where the grievance is not that there exists such an identity
as between the interveners and the party, but that it is lacking as between the
latter and the State of which it forms a constituent part and from which it seeks
violently to dissociate itself.”81
As to the first, Winfield saw only a moral justification, as international practice did not recognize any legal justification. He cited the intervention of Victor Emmanuel II and Garibaldi in Sicily in 1860 in this regard.82 As to the
second, Winfield similarly saw no legal justification, citing two serious objections to its validity. The first was that, if admitted “war might be raised in every
corner of the world in its vindication.”83 Second, Winfield argued, “[i]t is problematical whether a single one of the above interventions would . . . benefit any
of the assisted races, much more whether the remote and doubtful good to be
derived from them would outweigh the evils of what must almost certainly
prove a long and bloody struggle.”84
Thus, while it is somewhat unclear whether the situations posited by
Winfield exactly correlate with the right of protection situations discussed by
other writers, his general conclusion as to the doctrine’s invalidity certainly is
in marked contrast to their views.
O. Offutt. In his study of instances in which the armed forces of the United
States have been used for the protection of U.S. nationals and their property
abroad, Milton Offutt, writing in 1928, offered a brief discussion of the international legal principles justifying such use of force. He began by noting the obvious, namely, that “[t]he right of a state to protect by force its citizens living in a
foreign country when sudden disturbances in the foreign state threaten the
safety of their lives and property, and when the government under whose jurisdiction they reside has shown itself unable or unwilling to afford them reasonable protection, is a question which has engaged the attention of most writers
on international law.”85
His analysis, like that of most previous writers,86 concluded that, when
viewed as “non-political” intervention, the use of force for the protection of nationals may be justified. Thus, Offutt observed that “[w]hen, however, the distinction between political and non-political intervention has been appreciated,
some authorities have held that the use of force for the protection of its citizens
abroad becomes not only a right but, in certain cases, a duty of a sovereign
state; and that the state against which such force is used may not justly consider
itself aggrieved.”87 In support of this assertion, he relied upon a number of the
17
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Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad
authorities discussed previously in this chapter, including Oppenheim, Bonfils,
and Pradier-Fodere.88
P. Dunn. Frederick Dunn, writing in the decade preceding World War II, offered another perspective on the right of forcible protection.89 Although the
central focus of his work was on a State’s right to protect its nationals abroad
diplomatically, he did recognize the existence of a right to forcible protection in
certain circumstances. “It is only occasionally,” observed Dunn, “where aliens
are placed in a situation of grave danger from which the normal methods of diplomacy cannot extricate them, or where diplomatic negotiation for some
other reason is believed to be useless, that forceful intervention is apt to take
place.”90
Although there can be detected in Dunn’s work an undercurrent of disapproval of this type of forcible self-help, he recognized its validity given the existing international legal and political context. According to Dunn, ‘‘[i]n the
present stage of organization of the international community, the enforcement
of legal obligations is still left in large measure to the individual states, i.e., to
what is called ‘self-help’ (a situation that naturally favors the stronger as against
the weaker states). Armed intervention is only one of various means of enforcement that have been developed.”91
Thus, although the primary focus of Dunn’s work was on the right to diplomatic protection, he recognized the existence of a right of forcible protection in
cases where the former proved ineffective. It is important to note, however,
that Dunn viewed this right not as an absolute one, but as one formed from the
exigencies of the existing international legal and political system.
Q. Hindmarsh. Representative of the thought on forcible protection of nationals abroad in the decade preceding World War II are the observations of Hindmarsh writing in 1933.92 His analysis was two-fold, the first step being a
recognition of the frequent use of military and naval forces to accomplish such
protection, and the second step being an exposition and critique of the international legal principles allegedly justifying such actions.
Hindmarsh recognized that ‘‘[t]he use of military or naval force against an
offending state to compel recognition of alleged international obligations has
been a frequent practice of powerful states.”93 As examples, he singled out as
representative a number of instances of forcible protection by the United
States, particularly those instances analyzed by Offutt.94 In addition, however,
Hindmarsh pointed to the actions of other powerful States of the day, including
the Italian bombardment of the Greek island of Corfu in 1923 95 and the
18
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Japanese occupation of Chinese territory in Manchuria in 1931.96 Hindmarsh
concluded his survey of State practice with the sound observation that “[only]
in a very primitive stage of law can such self-help sanctions be tolerated. Their
exercise permits the confusion of law and vengeance, evades impartial judgment, and retards the free development of an international legal system. The
continuation of self-help in modern international law is as much an anachronism as private vengeance in the legal relations of individuals.”97
Hindmarsh’s analysis of the legal underpinnings of the right of protection
was characterized by his rejection of precedent as a justification for the continued validity of the right of protection in the modern international political and
legal system.
Measures of force short of war were constantly employed during the
Nineteenth Century and were justified as reprisals. Thus, after a century of
practice the validity of such measures became recognized as part of customary
international law. States which employed reprisals defended them as necessary,
ultimate sanctions, short of war, for the enforcement of international rights.
Finally, the practice of reprisals received some support from vague theoretical
concepts such as the rights of existence, self-defense, and independence. Thus
custom, necessity, and fundamental right were appealed to in order to justify
continued resort to State self-help in time of peace. Little thought was given by
jurists to the possibility that new conditions of international life might render
custom obsolete and devoid of practical justification, that new and more effective means of enforcing law might be found, and further, that fundamental
rights are always conditional upon fundamental duties.98
Hindmarsh argued that such a rationale, while applicable to the Nineteenth
Century system of independent political units, was no longer appropriate in a
System increasingly characterized by interdependence rather than independence among States. Accordingly, in his view, the development of an international organization to settle disputes among States, rather than the Nineteenth
Century principles of unilateral forcible self-help, would best serve modern international legal and political conditions.99
R. Accioly. Yet another pre-World War II view of the right of protection was
that of the Brazilian jurist Accioly, writing in 1940.100 Following a traditional
exposition of the right of a State to protect its nationals abroad through
diplomacy, Accioly proceeded to discuss a State’s remedies when such diplomatic efforts fail. “Should the local authorities declare themselves powerless to
grant the claimed protection or demonstrate their indifference to the claims,
an international conflict may arise; and if there is shown the impossibility of an
19
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amicable solution to the dispute, the claimant State has the right of recourse to
coercive measures.”101
Thus, Accioly, on the eve of World War II, demonstrated the continued acceptance of the broad right to use forcible protection, not limited to situations
wherein the lives and property of a State’s nationals were immediately at risk.
As the preceding discussion reveals, the juridical underpinnings of international legal principles justifying the use of force to protect nationals and their
property abroad are rooted in the writings of the “classical” writers on international law, given the many references to the views of Grotius relative to the importance of the citizen to the State and the right of one State to enforce its
rights against another State, by force if necessary.102
Similarly, Wolff’s thoughts, particularly with reference to the validity of the
use of force to enforce a State’s rights,103 also have influenced many of the later
writers on the subject of forcible protection.104 Vattel’s position on the State’s
obligation to protect its citizen, albeit limited by a concern for the rights of
other States,105 finds restatement in the views of subsequent writers on the protection of nationals abroad.106
From this cursory survey of some of the leading publicists, there can be seen
the gradual development of a principle justifying the forcible protection of nationals and their property abroad. Nevertheless, by the outbreak of World War
II the desirability of forcible protection was being questioned by a growing
number of writers.
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